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Abstract
In the wake of the major accounting scandals, 
internal auditing has emerged as a powerful 
force in promoting effective controls, risk 
management, and governance in U.S. 
companies. This article highlights recent 
internal audit-related problems that were 
revealed in SOX Section 404 reports and offers 
specific recommendations for building an 
effective, value-adding internal audit function. 
Introduction 
Since the major accounting scandals in 2001 
and 2002, as well as the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002), the 
internal auditing profession has experienced 
unprecedented growth and prominence. 
Internal audit budgets, staffing, and 
boardroom exposure have increased (Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Raghunandan 2005), and the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) has seen an 
explosion of membership and interest. In fact, 
one prominent CFO stated, “[Internal] auditors 
are rock stars now. This is their day in the sun” 
(Liebs 2004).
Internal auditors are experts in governance, risk 
management, and internal control—areas that 
many companies have emphasized to achieve 
compliance with SOX. Many public companies 
have dealt with SOX Section 404 audits of the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting, and a host of organizations are 
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exploring the implementation of enterprise risk 
management tools. On top of these challenges, 
the pressure to produce reliable financial 
reports has caused many audit committees to 
lean more heavily on their internal auditors for 
information and technical guidance related to 
risks and controls.
Given recent developments, we believe that 
almost any organization can benefit from an 
effective internal audit function. In this article, 
we (a) describe the role of internal audit in the 
organization, (b) highlight some recent internal 
audit problems revealed in SOX Section 404 
reports, and (c) offer practical suggestions for 
building an effective, value-adding internal 
audit function. We hope that the insights 
provided will be useful to managers and  
audit committee members in a variety  
of organizations.
The Role of Internal Audit
The IIA (2007b) defines internal auditing as 
follows:
Internal auditing is an independent, 
objective assurance and consulting activity 
designed to add value and improve an 
organization’s operations. It helps an 
organization accomplish its objectives by 
bringing a systematic, disciplined approach 
to evaluate and improve the effectiveness 
of risk management, control, and 
governance processes. 
The key to internal audit adding value is 
that it provides objective evaluations of an 
organization’s processes and operations. The 
main focus is on improving risk management, 
internal controls, and governance so that 
stakeholders’ value is preserved. In other 
words, internal audit seeks to improve the 
organization’s operations and to reduce the 
chance of negative surprises, including those 
created by unreliable financial reporting. 
Through its monitoring efforts in such areas 
as fraud prevention, improving business 
processes, and promoting reliable information 
(including financial reports) and sound controls, 
a properly designed and functioning internal 
audit group can add significant value to an 
organization. Effective internal audit functions 
also can contribute greatly to SOX Section 404 
audits, performing some work on which the 
external auditor can rely. Such arrangements 
can reduce Section 404 compliance costs.1       
New York Stock Exchange companies are 
required to have an internal audit function. 
For other U.S. companies, internal audit is 
a voluntary mechanism. Internal auditing 
appears to be growing rapidly in popularity, 
whether implemented as an in-house function 
or outsourced to an accounting firm or other 
provider. Research suggests that there is 
significant protection in having an internal 
audit function. For example, Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Lapides (2000) found that 
the presence of an internal audit function was 
much less common in companies that had been 
accused of accounting fraud by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. The differences 
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms 
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were particularly noticeable in two industries. 
In the technology industry, none of the fraud 
firms had an internal audit function, versus  
82 percent of the no-fraud firms. In the 
healthcare industry, 13 percent of the 
fraudulent firms had an internal audit function, 
versus 74 percent of the non-fraudulent firms. 
Clearly, there is a strong association between 
the presence of an internal audit function and 
reduced accounting fraud risk.
Recent Internal Audit Problems
We believe that one way to learn how to 
“do internal audit right” is to study cases 
where there have been internal audit-related 
problems. To highlight deficiencies in the 
internal audit arena, we recently searched 
SOX Section 404 internal control reports for 
cases where there were material weaknesses 
in internal control related to the company’s 
internal audit function.2 
Section 404 of SOX requires the external 
auditor to test the company’s internal control 
over financial reporting, and to highlight any 
material weaknesses that existed as of the end 
of the fiscal year. Compliance with Section 404 
currently is required for public companies with 
over $75 million in public float and will  
be required for smaller public companies  
in the future.
According to PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2 
(PCAOB 2004, para. 10), “A material weakness 
is a significant deficiency, or combination of 
significant deficiencies, that results in more 
than a remote likelihood that a material 
misstatement of the annual or interim financial 
statements will not be prevented or detected.” 
The standard states that one strong indicator 
of a material weakness is (para. 140): “The 
internal audit function or the risk assessment 
function is ineffective at a company for which 
such a function needs to be effective for the 
company to have an effective monitoring or 
risk assessment component, such as for very 
large or highly complex companies.” 3 
The Audit Analytics database revealed 16 
public companies from late 2004 through 
mid-October 2006 with internal audit-related 
material weaknesses or remediation plans. 
In each case, either the Section 404 report 
highlighted an internal audit-related material 
weakness, or management’s plan to remedy a 
material weakness included some discussion of 
enhancing the internal audit function. While 
these 16 companies represent a very small 
percentage of public companies subject to SOX 
Section 404, we believe that these weaknesses 
illustrate important issues for managers and 
audit committee members to consider.
Exhibit 1 provides an overview of the 16 
companies’ size, industry, auditor, and material 
weaknesses. The companies are reasonably 
large, with median market value, revenues, 
and assets in the $500 million or higher range, 
and they are primarily manufacturing or 
financial firms. Most of the companies have 
Big 4 external auditors and typically have other 
internal control problems in addition to their 
internal audit issues (the median number of 
material weaknesses per company is 4.5, with a 
range of 1–10).
Internal auditors are experts in governance, risk management, 
and internal control—areas that many companies have 
emphasized to achieve compliance.
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Exhibit 1 
Sample Description – Companies with Internal 
Audit-Related Problems (n = 16)
Exhibit 2 presents wording quoted or adapted 
from the 16 companies’ 10-Ks (which contain 
the management and external auditor reports 
on internal control) that describes the internal 
audit problems and management’s efforts to  
 
fix/remediate the problems. While many of 
the disclosures do not provide much detail (we 
provide the full text of the relevant portions 
in Exhibit 2), some interesting overall patterns 
emerge from reviewing this table. 
In terms of material weaknesses, the 
most commonly cited issue is the lack of a 
comprehensive or effective internal audit 
program/function (seven companies). This 
problem generally refers to a pervasive failure 
to implement effective internal auditing, 
which means that internal auditors do not 
adequately monitor key risks and controls. 
This problem also can result from internal 
audit getting “sidetracked” by management 
requests. For example, the disclosure for Ligand 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. indicates that the internal 
audit department was redirected to help with 
the company’s restatement of its financial 
statements, the Director of Internal Audit 
resigned, and the company did not complete 
much of its internal audit work. 
Other problems with internal audit include (a) 
a lack of independence in the internal audit 
function (Composite Technology and Ligand 
Pharmaceuticals), (b) insufficient oversight of 
internal audit/internal audit focus (Cellstar 
and Ultra Petroleum), and (c) issues related 
to inadequate auditing of international 
operations (H. B. Fuller and Thermadyne 
Holdings). Other problems mentioned include 
having too few internal auditors, having 
inexperienced internal auditors, not having  
an internal audit function at all, or internal 
audit failing to address problems found in 
control testing.
Panel A: Company Size ($000s)
            Median
Market Value (n = 14)        798,959
Revenues (n = 15)                      482,619
Assets (n = 15)         684,094
Panel B: SIC Codes
      N
1000–1999 Mining and Construction  1
2000–3999 Manufacturing   6
4000–4999  Transportation and  
Communication            1
5000–5999 Wholesale and Retail  2
6000–6999  Financial, Insurance, and  
Real Estate                   4
7000–7999 Services    2
Total                 16
Panel C: External Audit Firm
      N
Big 4      9
National Firms, Non Big 4   3
Local Firms     4
Total                 16
Panel D: Total Number of Material Weaknesses
Median number of material weaknesses  
per company     4.5
Range of material weaknesses  
per company             1 – 10
•		No	specific	mention	of	internal	audit	in	
material weaknesses. 
 
•		Hired	additional	accounts	receivable,	
tax and internal audit personnel, 
including a Director of Internal Audit 
and a Director of Tax.
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Exhibit 2 
Internal Audit-Related Control Weaknesses in SOX 404 Reports
•		Did	not	have	a	sufficient	number	of	
or appropriate depth of experience 
for accounting and finance, inventory 
management, real estate management, 
information technology, or internal 
audit personnel.
•		Did	not	have	an	adequate	monitoring	
program, including full testing of 
its internal control systems and a 
comprehensive internal audit function. 
•		Adequately	staffing	its	accounting	
and finance, inventory management, 
real estate management, information 
technology and internal audit 
departments.
•		Developing	an	adequate	monitoring	
program, including full testing of 
its internal control systems and a 
comprehensive internal audit function.
Company     Deficiencies related to internal audit            Remediation(s) related to internal audit
99 Cents  
Only  
Stores
2004
•		The	insufficient	or	lacking	procedures	
and structures include, but are not 
limited to (1) a failure to authorize and 
empower standing committees of the 
Board, including an audit committee 
and a compensation committee, 
(2) a failure to approve governance 
structures including charters, 
delegations of authority, codes of ethics 
and appropriate conduct for officers 
and directors, controls regarding 
conflicts of interest, definition of 
roles and responsibilities, approval of 
budgets, and (3) a lack of an internal 
audit function. 
•		An	internal	audit	function	will	be	
developed to perform periodic reviews 
to evaluate adherence to formalized 
procedures and controls over the 
financial reporting processes performed 
by the Company.
Accupoll 
Holding 
Corp. 2005
Aspen  
Technology,
Inc. 2005
(continued)
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Company    Deficiencies related to internal audit   Remediation(s) related to internal audit
Bally 
Technologies, 
Inc. 2005
•		Ineffective	controls	at	the	entity	
level: As evidenced by the material 
weaknesses described above, and 
management’s final assessment of our 
internal controls, we have determined 
that our entity-level controls related 
to the control environment, risk 
assessment, monitoring function 
and dissemination of information 
and communication activities did 
not operate effectively, resulting in 
a material weakness in each COSO 
component (COSO 1992). Such entity-
level controls, and a comprehensive 
monitoring of internal controls by 
the internal audit function, are part 
of the framework to ensure that the 
designed system of internal control is 
operating effectively to ensure that 
significant transactions are adequately 
identified, recorded and disclosed. 
•	 No remediation efforts related to 
internal audit.
Bristow 
Group, Inc. 
2005
•	 No specific mention of internal audit 
in material weaknesses.  
•		Internal	audits	are	planned	to	ensure	
that the compliance program is 
followed.
Cellstar Corp.
2004
•		The	Company	did	not	maintain	
effective controls over the focus of the 
internal audit function. 
•		Increasing	the	level	of	monitoring	
through the internal audit function.
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China Energy 
Savings 
Technology, 
Inc. 2005
•		Lack	of	Internal	Audit	System.	
The internal audit department 
was ineffective in preventing and 
detecting control lapses and errors in 
the accounting of certain key areas 
like revenue recognition, purchase 
approvals, inter-company transactions, 
cash receipt and cash disbursement 
authorizations, inventory safeguard 
and proper accumulation for cost 
of products, in accordance with the 
appropriate costing method used by 
the company. 
•		Evaluating	the	internal	audit	function	
in relation to the Company’s financial 
resources and requirements.
Company    Deficiencies related to internal audit   Remediation(s) related to internal audit
Clifton 
Savings 
Bancorp, Inc.
2005
•		The	Company’s	internal	audit	
program was not sufficient to provide 
management a basis to assess the 
quality of the Company’s internal 
control performance over time. 
Accordingly, management concluded 
that the monitoring component of 
the Company’s internal control over 
financial reporting was not effective. 
Internal control monitoring involves 
assessing the design and operation of 
internal control on a timely basis, and 
taking necessary corrective actions. 
•		We	will	review	the	need	for	additional	
compliance/internal audit personnel.
•		We	will	request	testing	reports	from	
our internal auditor on a regular basis.
Composite 
Technology 
Corp. 
2005
•		The	Company	did	not	have	an	
independent internal audit 
function due to the small size of the 
organization. 
•		Evaluating	the	internal	audit	function	
in relation to the Company’s financial 
resources and requirements.
(continued)
Clearly, there is a strong association between the presence of an 
internal audit function and reduced accounting fraud risk.
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Flagstar 
Bancorp, Inc.
2004
•		Management	believes	that	the	
deficiencies noted above may have 
been the result of weaknesses such as 
(1) certain personnel lacking sufficient 
expertise in areas of U.S. GAAP, (2) 
inadequately trained employees, such 
as personnel who perform certain 
accounting functions that rely heavily 
on supervisors to identify problems 
and errors, (3) lack of communication 
between certain departments, (4) 
internal audit’s failure to address 
certain issues identified in the internal 
controls testing and (5) security around 
user access rights to certain application 
systems.
	•		No remediation efforts related to 
internal audit.
Company    Deficiencies related to internal audit   Remediation(s) related to internal audit
H. B. Fuller 
Company
2004
•		In	its	assessment	as	of	November	
27, 2004, management identified 
as a material weakness, insufficient 
supervision and oversight of certain 
local accounting personnel in its 
Chilean accounting operations. 
Specifically, Company policy did 
not provide for regional financial 
management or internal audit review 
of the local books and records of the 
smaller locations within the Company’s 
Latin America region, which includes 
the Chilean operations. As a result 
of this material weakness in internal 
control, H.B. Fuller Company’s financial 
statements were misstated due to 
the intentional recording of incorrect 
accounting entries by local accounting 
personnel under the supervision of the
•	The	company	is	in	the	process	of	
expanding internal audit resources in 
the Latin America region.
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Company    Deficiencies related to internal audit   Remediation(s) related to internal audit
H. B. Fuller 
Company
2004
(continued)
Chilean financial controller beginning 
in 1999, and continuing through 
the third quarter of 2004. These 
incorrect accounting entries resulted 
in the overstatement of other current 
assets and income taxes payable, the 
understatement of notes payable 
and trade payables, and a cumulative 
overstatement of net income during the 
aforementioned period amounting to 
$3.1 million. 
Impac 
Mortgage 
Holdings, Inc.
2004
•	 [After a discussion of a material 
weakness] We also noted significant 
deficiencies in that our internal audit 
function did not provide an adequate 
or effective monitoring of our 
controls, and we needed to evaluate 
whether we have appropriate internal 
resources to manage and monitor 
work performed by our outsourced 
tax compliance function. 
•		We	hired	outside	consultants	to	
assist our internal audit group in 
documenting our accounting and 
business processes and identifying 
areas that require control or process 
improvement.
•		We	hired	a	Director	of	Internal	Audit	
whose primary responsibilities are 
to perform risk assessment and 
monitoring of our system of internal 
controls and, in addition, to oversee 
the establishment of formal policies 
and procedures throughout our 
organization.
(continued)
Ligand  
Pharma-
ceuticals Inc.
2005
•	 Internal Audit. The Company did 
not maintain an independent effective 
Internal Audit Department. This material 
weakness resulted from the fact that: 
1) the Internal Audit Department was 
redirected during the second, third 
and fourth quarters of 2005 to assist 
with the restatement of the Company’s 
consolidated financial statements,
•		Internal	Audit	Plan.	As	discussed	under	
the caption Remediation Relating to 
Accounting Personnel, the Company is 
in the process of recruiting a Director 
of Internal Audit and such position is 
targeted to be filled during the second 
quarter of 2006, or as soon as possible 
thereafter. Until the position is filled, 
the Company has engaged a nationally
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Ligand  
Pharma-
ceuticals Inc.
2005
and 2) the Director of Internal Audit 
resigned December 2, 2005. As a 
result, the Company’s Internal Audit 
Department executed only a small 
portion of the activities contemplated 
to be performed pursuant to the 2005 
internal audit plan. In late December 
2005, the Company engaged a 
nationally recognized consulting firm 
to perform the planned activities of 
the Internal Audit Department, most 
notably the Company’s compliance 
efforts with respect to Section 404 of 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. While 
this material weakness did not result 
in adjustments to the Company’s 2005 
consolidated financial statements, 
it is reasonably possible that, if not 
remediated, given the importance of 
a functioning effective Internal Audit 
Department in the maintenance of 
effective internal controls over financial 
reporting, this material weakness could 
result in a material misstatement of 
the Company’s financial statement 
accounts that might result in a material 
misstatement to a future annual or 
interim period.
(continued)
    recognized external consulting firm to 
perform the functions of the Internal 
Audit Department. It is anticipated 
that the 2006 Internal Audit Plan will 
be approved by the Audit Committee 
in the second quarter of 2006, and 
until the Director of Internal Audit 
is hired, the Company will continue 
to utilize the consulting firm to 
implement and execute the 2006 
internal audit plan.
•		Monitoring	Controls.	As	discussed	
under Internal Audit Plan above, 
the Company is in the process of 
recruiting a Director of Internal 
Audit. Additionally, and until the 
Company has hired the Director of 
Internal Audit, the Company has 
engaged a nationally recognized 
external consulting firm to implement 
and execute the 2006 internal audit 
plan starting in the second quarter 
of 2006. As part of the internal 
audit plan, these consultants will be 
responsible for assisting management 
with updating and maintaining the 
Company’s documentation of internal 
control over financial reporting. The 
consultants will also be used until 
and after the hiring of the Director 
of Internal Audit to assist with the 
testing of such internal controls 
and in monitoring the progress of 
any ongoing and newly identified 
remediation efforts to help ensure the 
timely completion of the Company’s 
2006 monitoring program.
Company    Deficiencies related to internal audit   Remediation(s) related to internal audit
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Company    Deficiencies related to internal audit   Remediation(s) related to internal audit
Riggs 
National 
Corporation
2004
•		As	of	December	31,	2004,	the	
Company’s internal audit program 
was not sufficient to provide 
management a basis to assess the 
quality of the Company’s internal 
control performance over time. 
Accordingly, management concluded 
that the monitoring component of 
the Company’s internal control over 
financial reporting was not effective. 
Internal control monitoring involves 
assessing the design and operation of 
internal control on a timely basis, and 
taking necessary corrective actions. 
•		The	Company	enhanced	the	internal	
audit program during 2004 and has 
now completed implementation 
of that program. However, as of 
December 31, 2004 the updated 
internal audit program was not in 
place for a sufficient time period to 
fully determine its effectiveness. The 
Company will continue to enhance 
its internal audit function in 2005 
by expanding the scope of certain 
internal audits, enhancing the 
tracking of outsourced audit work, 
and modifying its existing internal 
audit plan as necessary. This will also 
include continued focus and review 
of regulatory risk through the use of 
internal audit, including outsourced 
internal audit resources.
Thermadyne 
Holdings 
Corp.
2004
•		During	the	year-end	financial	
statement close process, we identified 
unexpected variations in the balance 
sheet data provided from our 
Brazilian subsidiary. After a rigorous 
internal audit at this subsidiary, it 
was concluded that certain period 
costs were improperly capitalized and 
included in inventory and intangibles. 
In addition, certain contingent tax 
refunds were improperly recognized 
prior to being received. In response to 
the errors identified at our Brazilian 
subsidiary, we performed internal 
audit procedures at our South African 
subsidiaries and determined that key 
•		In	order	to	remediate	our	insufficient	
controls relating to the oversight 
and monitoring of our smaller 
international locations, we will 
augment internal audit work already 
performed with a more extensive 
internal audit program for 2005 
that will include work performed at 
our smaller foreign locations, and 
additional audit resources.
(continued)
While the scope of the internal audit function will vary greatly 
across organizations, we believe that just about every organization 
can benefit from effective internal auditing.
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Company    Deficiencies related to internal audit   Remediation(s) related to internal audit
account reconciliations were not being 
performed in accounts receivable, 
inventory, and accounts payable. 
The internal audits at these locations 
resulted in adjustments recorded 
during the fourth quarter of 2004 to 
accounts receivable, inventory, prepaid 
expenses, intangibles, goodwill, and 
cost of sales. We have concluded 
that a material weakness exists due 
to insufficient controls relating to 
the oversight and monitoring of our 
smaller international locations. 
Thermadyne 
Holdings 
Corp.
2004
(continued)
Ultra 
Petroleum 
Corp. 
2005
•		The	Company	did	not	maintain	
effective company level controls. 
Specifically, (1) certain of its 
accounting personnel in key roles 
did not possess an appropriate level 
of technical expertise, and (2) the 
Company’s monitoring of the internal 
audit function was not sufficient to 
provide management a basis to assess 
the quality of the Company’s internal 
control performance over time.  
•		Increasing	training	for	the	Company’s	
current accounting personnel, hiring 
additional accounting personnel 
and engaging outside consultants 
with technical accounting expertise, 
as needed, and reorganizing the 
accounting department to ensure that 
accounting personnel have adequate 
experience, skills and knowledge 
relating to the accounting and  
internal audit functions assigned  
to them.
Note: The wording above is quoted or adapted from the companies’ auditor reports or management reports 
on internal control.
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Management’s discussion of any remediation 
efforts most commonly addresses staffing 
issues—hiring an Internal Audit Director, hiring 
additional internal audit staff, or engaging an 
outside consultant. Having the right people 
in place is absolutely critical to effective 
internal auditing, but internal audit talent is 
in high demand in today’s market. Thus, it is 
challenging for some companies to attract and 
retain top internal audit talent.
Other remedial steps cited include: 
•	enhancing	international	auditing	efforts,	
•		evaluating	the	overall	internal	audit	function	
in light of company characteristics, 
•		developing/enhancing	a	comprehensive	
internal audit function, and
•		addressing	such	issues	as	compliance	
auditing, additional testing/scope, greater 
communication through internal audit 
reports, better tracking of outsourced 
internal audit work, and increased training.
Suggestions for Managers and Audit 
Committee Members
How can organizations build their internal 
audit functions to provide maximum value? 
Based on the types of weaknesses identified 
in Exhibit 2, as well as our own experience 
researching internal audit issues for several 
years, we offer the following suggestions for 
management and audit committee members. 
We also encourage interested readers to 
consult a host of IIA resources available online 
at http://www.theiia.org/theiia/about-the-
profession/about-the-internal-audit-profession/ 
and the AICPA’s (2004) Evaluating the Internal 
Audit Team: Guidelines and Questions.
•	 Setting up an Internal Audit Function. Some 
organizations do not yet have an internal 
audit function, due to small organization size 
or lack of management or board support. 
While the scope of the internal audit function 
will vary greatly across organizations, we 
believe that just about every organization 
can benefit from effective internal auditing. 
Those beginning the process of establishing 
an internal audit function are encouraged 
to visit the IIA website (see Establishing an 
Internal Audit Shop, IIA 2007a) for tips in 
this regard. This process may start with one 
internal auditor, perhaps even part time, 
but we believe that this function is critical to 
effective governance, risk management, and 
control in the organization.
•		A Clear Internal Audit Charter. The internal 
audit charter should clearly establish the 
role and responsibilities of the internal 
audit function. If the charter is deficient, it 
increases the chance that internal audit will 
be sidetracked into non-core activities or 
simply fail to comprehensively monitor the 
organization’s risks and controls. The charter 
should unambiguously describe the scope 
of internal audit’s activities—both for the 
benefit of keeping internal audit on task, 
as well as informing others of the role of 
internal audit (see Tarr (2003) for  
specific guidance).
•		The Right People. If internal audit is going to 
be a major player in the organization, getting 
the right people on board is critical, especially 
in the Director of Internal Audit role (referred 
to as the “Chief Audit Executive” 
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    in IIA professional standards). Organizations 
need to consider the quantity of internal 
audit personnel needed, which may be less 
than some would imagine. Also critical are 
desired skill sets, which should match the 
types of risks faced by the organization. 
Some internal audit groups may require 
people with backgrounds in environmental 
issues, complex financial instruments, 
healthcare regulations, etc. Organizations 
need to recognize that internal audit talent 
can be expensive in today’s market. Finally, 
the organization should carefully consider 
whether internal audit will be an in-house 
function or will be outsourced to major 
accounting firm or other provider. There 
are advantages and disadvantages to each 
structure (see Rittenberg 1997; Rittenberg, 
Moore, and Covaleski 1999).
•  Carefully Constructed Reporting Channels. To 
whom does internal audit report? An internal 
audit group cannot easily provide objective 
oversight of management if the Chief Audit 
Executive reports only to management. After 
all, it is difficult to be the watchdog of one’s 
boss. What many, including the IIA, have 
called for is primary internal audit reporting 
to the audit committee, with administrative 
reporting to management (CFO, Controller, 
or even CEO) since the audit committee is not 
on-site most of the time. If the internal audit 
function is to be sufficiently independent, 
then it is critical that it report to the audit 
committee and not be under the control of 
management. Currently, the pendulum clearly 
has swung toward audit committee (rather 
than management) oversight of internal 
audit. Many of internal audit’s activities 
now are related to performing assurance 
work for the audit committee, rather than 
“internal consulting” or special projects for 
management.
•	 Covering International Risks. As indicated 
by two of the companies in the sample, 
covering international risks can be a challenge 
for internal audit. Remote locations often 
involve language and culture issues, as well 
as significant travel and time costs. Despite 
these challenges, it is worthwhile to carefully 
consider international risks and to appreciate 
the implications of a reduced emphasis on 
international operations due to the hassle 
and cost of auditing them. Problems in an 
international location can become significant 
corporate issues.
•  Monitoring the Internal Audit Function. 
Once the internal audit function is designed 
and operational, it is important to continue 
to monitor internal audit’s activities. Both 
the audit committee and top management 
may participate in this monitoring, as each 
party benefits from internal audit’s efforts. 
Questions to consider in this monitoring 
process include the following:
•		Are	we	comfortable	with	the	quality	of	
internal audit’s work? Are we learning new 
things from internal audit’s reports? 
•		Does	the	scope	of	internal	audit’s	work	seem	
adequate? Does it appear to match our 
understanding of organizational risks?
•		How	is	internal	audit	viewed	in	the	
organization? Is internal audit a major 
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“player” in organizational decisions? Do 
people in the organization seek internal 
audit’s advice, or do they avoid internal audit 
at all costs?
•		Does	the	internal	audit	staffing	level	
appear adequate? Does the internal audit 
budget consider all essential areas? Does 
management try to constrain internal audit 
through budgetary means?
•		Have	internal	audit’s	findings	and	
recommendations been communicated to 
us in a timely and understandable manner? 
Have the recommendations resulted in value-
adding changes in the organization?
•		Does	the	Chief	Audit	Executive	communicate	
well with the audit committee? Does this 
person appear to have the respect of 
management and the external auditor?
•		Has	internal	audit’s	work	improved	our	
understanding of the organization’s internal 
controls and risks?
•		Is	internal	audit	responsive	to	audit	
committee requests for work in certain areas?
•		Is	internal	audit	responsive	to	audit	
committee suggestions for improvement?
•		Do	we	perceive	that	the	benefits	of	the	
internal audit function outweigh the costs of 
the function? Do we gather any metrics that 
are used in making such an assessment of 
internal audit costs and benefits?
Conclusion
Internal audit can be a powerful tool for 
improving operations, enhancing controls, 
managing risks, and promoting sound 
corporate governance. In the current 
environment of high accountability and 
continuing governance failures (e.g., stock 
option backdating), such elements are vital to 
organizational success.
Our review of recent internal audit problems 
cited in SOX Section 404 reports illustrates 
that not all companies have implemented 
effective internal audit functions. We believe 
that companies can learn from these problems, 
and we have offered several suggestions to 
managers and audit committee members  
for building an effective, value-adding  
internal audit function. We hope that these 
suggestions will help to drive future internal 
audit improvements.
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Endnotes
1   See IIA (2004) for details on the role of internal 
audit in Section 404 audits.
 2  We examined management’s internal control 
report and the auditor’s opinion on internal 
control over financial reporting, which often 
contain identical language to describe the 
material weaknesses. Typically, the auditor 
identifies the material weaknesses.
3    See COSO (1992) for discussion of the internal 
control framework and the importance of 
monitoring internal controls over time. Internal 
audit often takes the lead in monitoring the 
control system.
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Abstract 
To advance our knowledge about Internet 
abuse in the workplace, this study examines 
how deterrence mechanisms commonly 
used within organizations impact individual 
decisions to abuse the Internet. The study uses 
a policy-capturing approach to test the relative 
degree of deterrence imposed by common 
components of Internet acceptable use policies 
(AUPs). The results provide evidence that an 
AUP that defines acceptable Internet usage, 
imposes potential sanctions, and implements 
detection (or monitoring) mechanisms is an 
important deterrent of Internet abuse. In 
addition, these mechanisms are most effective 
when they are actively enforced. The study 
provides valuable insights and considerations 
for drafting and implementing an AUP in  
an organization.
Keywords: Non-work-related computing, 
general deterrence theory, Internet abuse, 
Internet acceptable use policy, self-control
Introduction
The Internet and its associated technologies 
have created a revolutionary change in the 
way business information flows. With the 
click of a button, we can communicate, order 
products, or track competitor activities, among 
other things. However, the Internet can be 
misused. The U.S. Treasury Department found 
that non-work-related computing (NWRC), 
such as online shopping, checking personal 
finances, answering personal emails, and 
using chat rooms, accounted for 51 percent 
of an employee’s time online (Davis, 2001). 
Urbaczewski and Jessup (2002) refer to the 
lost productivity that takes place directly 
after granting employees Internet access as a 
“productivity vacuum,” where the easy access 
to non-work-related activities is too tempting 
for employees to resist. In addition to the lost 
productivity, misuse of the Internet can cause 
other problems such as security concerns and 
reduced bandwidth, along with legal issues 
such as racist, sexist, and offensive materials 
being transmitted via email (Case and Young, 
2002a, 2002b). This gives management 
motivation to try to reduce or eliminate NWRC. 
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Some organizations try to curb NWRC by 
blocking access to unauthorized Internet sites; 
but due to the dynamic nature of the Internet, 
keeping a list of unauthorized sites updated 
can be difficult and time consuming. Instead, 
many organizations rely primarily on Internet 
acceptable use policies (AUPs). AUPs attempt 
to control NWRC by providing guidelines on 
appropriate computer use, and outline how 
the organization will monitor, enforce, and 
punish non-work-related activities (Lee and 
Lee, 2002; Woon and Pee, 2004). Despite the 
widespread use of AUPs1, NWRC has continued 
to grow (Lee and Lee, 2002; Lee, Lim, and 
Wong, 2005; Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002). In 
addition, managers encounter a catch-22 when 
introducing AUPs. Potential positive effects 
of AUPs, such as keeping employees on task, 
can be counteracted by reduced workplace 
satisfaction and trust (Urbaczewski and Jessup, 
2002). Despite the high degree of abuse shown 
in many studies, employees often use the 
Internet for short personal tasks or during 
breaks, which are not detrimental to the 
organization and would be consumed by other 
non-work-related tasks if the Internet were 
not available (Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002). 
Thus managers must make a decision about the 
amount of NWRC they are willing to tolerate to 
balance productivity and morale.
This paper helps resolve this paradox by 
providing insights into how effectively various 
components of an Internet acceptable use 
policy deters non-work-related computing. 
In other words, which components of an 
AUP give managers the most “bang-for-the-
buck?” By using a multi-criteria decision-
capturing approach (policy capturing), this 
study addresses these issues by examining 
how specific components of an AUP stack up 
against one another in deterring an employee’s 
intention to perform NWRC. 
Internet Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) 
Organizations are concerned about the 
consequences of NWRC, including lost 
productivity, potential legal liability, and 
poor corporate image. Many are resorting 
to AUPs for deterrence (Case and Young, 
2002a; Greenfield and Davis, 2002). Typical 
components of an AUP are:  
1.  an explanation of the scope of the AUP, (e.g. 
who and what does it apply to) 
2. a statement defining appropriate use 
3.  examples of appropriate versus 
inappropriate use 
4.  a statement defining punishment for 
inappropriate use
5.  a statement about the extent of monitoring, 
and 
6.  a signature of the reader acknowledging 
that they have received and understand the 
policy (Siau, Nah, & Teng, 2002)  
Even though AUPs are widespread, most 
companies do not actively enforce their policy 
(Greenfield and Davis, 2002). Despite the 
lack of enforcement, the mere adoption of 
an AUP by an organization has been shown 
to mitigate NWRC behavior due to increased 
employee awareness of the policy (Harrington, 
1996; Lee and Lee, 2002; Lee et al., 2005). 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, 
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Urbaczewski and Jessup (2002) suggest that 
regardless of their potential benefits, AUPs 
can reduce workplace satisfaction and trust; 
this is particularly exacerbated by monitoring 
mechanisms. Thus, it is important that firms 
do not implement deterrence measures 
haphazardly and instead try to implement 
mechanisms that have the greatest ratio of 
deterrence to dissatisfaction. To this end, the 
current paper presents an exploratory study to 
answer the research question: 
What is the relative impact of specific control 
mechanisms commonly found in AUPs on 
deterring NWRC?  
AUPs from a General Deterrence 
Perspective  
General deterrence theory (GDT) provides 
a theoretical foundation for proposing and 
evaluating deterrence components within 
an AUP, and based on GDT we are able 
to hypothesize the relative importance 
of several of the deterrence components. 
Under general deterrence theory, individuals 
make rational risk/reward decisions based 
on their expected gratification from taking 
advantage of opportunities, versus their 
perceptions of the likelihood and severity 
of potential consequences. GDT has long 
been the foundation for crime prevention. It 
provides insights on how security measures can 
discourage illicit behaviors. GDT has been used 
by criminologists to examine the effects of laws 
on crime, but it has only recently been used to 
look at workplace issues such as NWRC (Lee  
et al., 2005; Lee and Lee, 2002; Woon and Pee, 2004). 
AUPs comply with GDT because they clarify 
unethical Internet use and raise employee 
consciousness to the potential for negative 
repercussions for abusive behavior. Specifically, 
AUPs explicate the potential severity of 
consequences, and by revealing the existence 
of security and detection systems, they create 
awareness to the likelihood of consequences 
coming about. 
Researchers who have examined the impact 
of penalties on intentions to perform NWRC 
found that the mere awareness of others being 
reprimanded for performing NWRC reduced 
user intentions (Lee and Lee, 2002; and Woon 
and Pee, 2004). This is an intuitively logical 
finding and we conjecture that enforcement 
is the key determinant on deterring user 
intentions. Even when an individual is likely to 
get caught performing NWRC (for example, by 
detection systems) and potential ramifications 
are severe, those mechanisms will have 
relatively little salience without enforcement. 
This can be easily illustrated with a short 
analogy. Imagine that fines for highway 
speeding and the number of highway patrol 
officers are greatly increased. Yet you are not 
aware that the speed laws are ever enforced; 
everyone just gets a warning. Would you 
expect drivers to be compelled to comply with 
speed limits in this case? Probably not. 
Kelman (1958) was one of the first to use this 
line of thinking. Kelman found that individual 
beliefs tend to change to conform with 
another party’s rules when the other party 
is able to deliver punishment, is described to 
be socially acceptable, or is described to be 
highly credible. This has been extended to the 
business context by various authors (Tyler 2001; 
Tyler and Blader, 2005).
…non-work-related computing (NWRC), such as online shopping, 
checking personal finances, answering personal emails, and 
using chat rooms, accounted for 51 percent of an employee’s  
time online.
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Based on this, we conjecture that the 
awareness that sanctions are being enforced 
will make the threat of sanctions more credible 
and increase perceptions about the likelihood 
of punishment, and will thus be the most 
salient deterrent on NWRC. 
H1:  Enforced sanctions will have the greatest 
degree of deterrence on NWRC.
Even without awareness of enforcement, we 
expect that the threat of sanctions will still 
have a relatively strong impact on deterring 
NWRC, particularly if the level of sanction is 
strong, such as getting fired. GDT suggests 
that individuals weigh potential sanctions 
against the gratification received from an illicit 
act. Thus, these sanctions are important in a 
decision maker’s mental account. Based on 
this, we suggest that the threat of sanctions, 
regardless of whether or not a decision maker 
is aware of the sanctions being enforced, will 
have a high level of deterrence on NWRC as 
compared to other common components of an 
AUP. 
H2:  The threat of sanctions will have a high 
degree of deterrence on NWRC relative 
to other components of an AUP.
We also expect detection systems to have 
a strong affect. Detection systems increase 
perceptions of the likelihood of sanctions being 
enforced (Hollinger and Clark, 1983). Based 
on this we expect detection systems to have 
significant impact on deterring NWRC relative 
to other common components of an AUP. 
H3:  Detection systems will have a high 
degree of deterrence on NWRC relative 
to other components of an AUP.
Signing an Internet acceptable use policy may 
not link directly to general deterrence theory, 
but we expect it to enhance other control 
mechanisms. For instance, signing a statement 
saying that one has read and will comply 
with the AUP will make the individual more 
mindful of the AUP’s components. Case and 
Young (2002b) found anecdotal evidence that 
deterrence will be enhanced when employees 
are required to sign a statement indicating 
that they agreed to comply with the AUP at 
their organization. They found that 60 percent 
of participants who were required to sign 
their Internet use policy felt the policy was an 
effective deterrent. However, since signing a 
statement does not deter non-work-related 
computing itself, we do not expect it to have a 
strong relative impact on NWRC. 
Finally, an AUP that merely outlines acceptable 
use may affect NWRC intentions by raising 
awareness to what type of behavior is 
acceptable to the employer. Using Kelman’s 
perspective, this would have an impact if the 
respondent feels that it is socially desirable to 
follow the rules outlined in the AUP. However, 
the pervasiveness of NWRC seems to indicate 
that it is developing into a socially acceptable 
behavior. Based on this, we expect that merely 
outlining acceptable behavior will have a low 
relative impact on NWRC. 
The Study  
The study used a procedure for examining 
multi-criteria decisions (policy capturing) 
that is most commonly used to develop an 
understanding of the relative salience of 
available pieces of information on a decision 
(e.g. Butler and Cantrell, 1984; Pearson, Crosby 
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and Shim, 1996). The results of a policy-
capturing analysis provide an additive linear 
model that illustrates how a decision-maker 
weighs available information (cues) to arrive at 
a decision (Karren and Barringer, 2002). Kline 
and Sulsky (1995, p. 394) state that “the goal of 
this approach is to understand an individual’s 
decision-making “policy” by observing the 
relationships between the decision cues given 
to the individual, and the final decision made 
by the individual and then modeling that 
relationship using an idiographic multiple 
regression analysis (i.e., regression analysis 
carried out for a single individual). The results 
of the analysis provide a description of how the 
individual decision-maker weights the various 
cues to arrive at his or her decision. Thus, 
within the constraints of the cue information 
presented, each individual’s decision-making 
“policy” can be observed.” 
The cues (or independent variables), in this 
study are: 
 
1.  the perceived existence of an acceptable use 
policy 
2.  the degree of punishment for performing 
NWRC 
3.  awareness of others receiving punishment 
for NWRC 
4. evidence of detection systems, and 
5.  a signature by the participant (employee) on 
the acceptable use policy, which indicates 
that they have received it. 
 
The final decision (or dependent variable) is the 
individual’s intention to perform NWRC.  
We surveyed 87 people at 12 companies 
representing a wide variety of industries 
throughout the Midwest. Participants were 
given 20 unique scenarios2  covering all 
combinations of the independent variables 
with the existence of each independent 
variable, or cue, indicated by a yes or no 
statement. Considering each scenario, 
respondents were asked a question about 
whether or not they would use their company’s 
resources for personal use. The respondents 
were also asked whether or not they would 
use their company’s resources for personal 
use if they worked in a cubicle or an office 
(Appendix 1). In addition to the scenarios, 
basic demographic information was collected, 
along with open-ended questions about how 
the participants felt about NWRC in general 
and whether or not they felt NWRC was an 
inappropriate behavior.
The policy-capturing analysis involved 
performing a multiple regression for each 
respective participant on each of the 20 
scenarios. The relative salience of each cue is 
represented by the average of the individual 
beta weights. The pairwise differences of the 
average beta weights were tested for  
statistical significance using Tukey’s honestly 
significant difference (HSD). 
Results 
In general, enforcement resulted in the 
greatest reduction on intentions to perform 
NWRC. Enforcement was initiated by 
presenting respondents with a scenario that 
indicated that others had been fired for NWRC. 
This was followed by sanctions (possibly getting 
fired or not), detection systems, an AUP that 
merely communicates what types of computing 
is acceptable, and finally signing or certifying 
that one has read, understands, and will abide 
by the policy (Exhibit 1). This hierarchy did not 
change considering the participant’s perceived 
level of privacy, an office or a cubicle. 
The test of pairwise differences indicates that 
the marginal impact of sanctions, detection 
systems, and enforcement activities were not 
significantly different from one another, and 
the impact of sanctions, detections systems 
and outlining acceptable Internet use were 
not different from one another. Requiring 
individuals to sign a statement indicating they 
had read, understand, and will abide by the 
policy had the smallest marginal impact and 
was significantly different than the other cues.
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Exhibit 1. Study Results
You are aware of others within the 
organization being fired for 
performing non- work-related activities 
on their computers.
Independent Variables
Decision Cues 
(Deterrence Measures)
DV1 (Overall 
Likelihood to 
perform NWRC)
DV3 (Overall 
Likelihood to 
perform NWRC 
if in an Cubicle)
DV2 (Overall 
Likelihood to 
perform NWRC  
if in an Office)
Beta         Group          Beta         Group         Beta        Group 
Mean       Rank            Mean       Rank            Mean      Rank
The company’s Internet use policy 
contains a statement stating that you  
may be fired if you perform non-work- 
related activities on your computer.
The company employs security 
detection systems capable of 
monitoring your computer usage.
The company employs an Internet 
use policy that states what types of 
Internet use are acceptable.
You are required to sign the Internet 
use policy indicating that you have read, 
understand, and will abide by the policy.
-0.381        1  -0.375        1        -0.381        1
-0.292        1,2 -0.264        1        -0.285        1
-0.268        1,2 -0.271        1        -0.261        1
-0.248        2  -0.259        1        -0.260        1
-0.100        3  -0.097        2        -0.089        2
*** Group Rank 1 is the highest rated group and is significantly different from 2 and 3; 2 is the second highest 
rated group and is significantly different 1 and 3; and 3 is the third highest rated group and is significantly 
different from 1 and 2.  Cues that are rated 1, 2  are significantly different from only the cue rated 3.
Despite the high degree of abuse shown in many studies, 
employees often use the Internet for short personal tasks or during 
breaks, which are not detrimental to the organization…
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Analysis and Discussion  
As we conjectured, the components of the 
AUP that could be linked to GDT—sanctions, 
detection systems, and enforcement—were 
highly salient. The component that doesn’t 
seem to have a link to GDT is the signature 
requirement, which was the lowest-rated cue 
and was significantly different from the other 
four cues. Surprisingly, implementing a policy 
that merely outlines what type of behavior is 
acceptable was equally as effective as sanctions 
and detection systems statistically. 
From a policy-maker perspective, this seems 
to indicate that severe sanctions that are 
likely to be enforced are relatively effective 
ways to deter NWRC. This gives a signal to 
employers that if NWRC is a significant problem 
within their organization, they may want to 
implement a policy that includes potential 
sanctions that the employer is prepared to 
enforce. However, if NWRC is only a minor issue 
within their organization, a policy that merely 
outlines acceptable use may suffice and, in fact, 
may have the most cost benefit considering 
the potential loss of workplace satisfaction 
and trust that can occur when more intrusive 
mechanisms are introduced. 
To give additional insight into the results, 
we solicited open-ended responses related 
the participant’s feelings on the topic, and 
they yielded many interesting comments. In 
general, employees felt that occasional use 
of the Internet for personal purposes is not a 
problem. They seem to feel that employer’s 
demands have increased over the years; thus 
the separation of work and personal time 
gets blurred and employees have no choice 
but to manage some personal issues while 
at work. However, many employees felt that 
their employer should have a policy as long 
as it is fair. For example, one employee states, 
“there needs to be a policy, but a policy that 
can be fair and enforced.” There were also 
many comments about pornography. and 
in general employees feel it should not be 
tolerated. It seems the general attitude among 
the employees surveyed is that NWRC is not 
a problem, which is contradictory to Davis’s 
(2002) findings. However, the employees seem 
to feel that a policy is still in order. This seems 
to indicate that employees feel that certain 
types of NWRC are acceptable, while others are 
not. Exhibit 2 illustrates respondent’s general 
concerns towards NWRC. These concerns give 
some insight into how workplace norms may 
be developing.
1. Occasional use of the Internet for personal purposes is acceptable.
2. Pornography should not be tolerated.
3. Increasing employer demands are forcing employees to manage personal issues at work.
4. The feel that the NWRC is not a major issue.
5. Even though the NWRC is not a major issue, a policy is still in order.
Exhibit 2.  Employee Concerns
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The implication of these results for 
practitioners is that an Internet acceptable use 
policy outlining acceptable uses does provide 
a degree of deterrence, but the effectiveness 
of the AUP can be enhanced by including a 
statement indicating severe consequences (e.g., 
you may be fired for viewing pornography). 
With that said, the employer must be prepared 
to enforce the policy since the most salient 
component to our participants was the 
awareness of enforcement. In addition, security 
measures that increase the likelihood of 
detection are important relative to other  
AUP components. 
Yet despite the understanding that this study 
gives us about the relative importance of 
deterrence measures, managers are still left 
with a dilemma about which components 
to implement and how severe to set the 
punishment, since enforcement does not come 
without cost and as mentioned previously, 
monitoring activities can create employee 
discontent (Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002). 
There are several items that management 
should consider when implementing an AUP 
(see Exhibit 3). 
•		First,	what	type	of	employees	does	the	firm	
have? If the typical employee’s job requires 
considerable use of the Internet, an AUP 
may be a more practical solution to NWRC 
deterrence as compared with technology-
based solutions such as access restriction, 
where keeping a restricted website list can be 
time consuming. 
•		Next,	what	type	of	culture	does	the	
organization have? Would employees accept 
an AUP? If employees are accustomed to 
a relaxed environment, implementing a 
restrictive policy could create disgruntlement, 
particularly if it involves monitoring  
Internet activity. 
•		Third,	the	punishment	should	fit	the	offense.	
It would seem to be impractical to threaten 
dismissal for relatively small infractions such 
as managing personal finances or emailing 
friends, as compared to more serious issues 
such as viewing pornography. 
    However, habitual use of any kind can cause 
a productivity issue. We suggest NWRC 
infractions of any kind should be carefully 
documented in employee personnel files. 
This will allow the organization to more easily 
recognize those that are repeat offenders 
and give adequate documentation in case 
ramifications are in order. 
•		Next,	what	is	the	cost	of	implementation,	
particularly the implementation of  
detection measures? 
•		Finally,	if	the	firm	has	decided	to	implement	
an AUP, management should create buy-
in. Surprising employees with a new policy 
such as an AUP could exacerbate potential 
employee dissatisfaction. We suggest that 
firms make their employees fully aware of 
implications and ramifications of an AUP, and 
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employees be given an opportunity to voice 
opinions before the AUP is implemented. 
However, we propose that as AUPs continue 
to become more common in the workplace, 
employees will be more familiar with AUPs 
and employee dissatisfaction will diminish.
Despite our findings, there are still 
unanswered questions that could impact 
many organizations. We suggest that the 
salience of the AUP components examined 
here will change if they are implemented 
to different degrees. For example, at what 
level of punishment does the threat lose 
its effectiveness? Future researchers should 
extend this study by focusing on the impact of 
different levels of AUP components. 
We also question how well an AUP will work 
on employees that work from home. We have 
suggested that the level of privacy, either in 
an office or a cubicle, has no bearing on the 
salience of AUP components. However, we 
recommend that future researchers examine 
other settings, such as a home office. 
Finally, due to the global nature of business 
and the Internet, we feel it is important to 
understand how AUPs are accepted in different 
cultures. For example, are individuals in cultures 
that rate higher in uncertainty avoidance more 
likely to find the mere existence of a policy 
more salient, or do the findings about the lack 
of difference between men and women hold  
in cultures that are more or less masculine?  
We suggest that future researchers test our 
model globally.  
Limitations  
The study has several limitations, most notably 
measuring participant intentions rather than 
actual behavior. However, research in many 
contexts; including ethics, have relied on the 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) to 
understand how behavioral intentions lead to 
action. 
The next limitation is that this study treats all 
forms of non-work-related computing equally, 
as if time wasted shopping or browsing stock 
Exhibit 3.  Management Considerations
1. What type of employees does the firm have? Is it feasible to restrict Internet usage?
2. What is the corporate culture?  Will it accept an AUP?
3. The punishment should fit the crime.
4. Document all NWRC infractions.
5. What is the cost?
6. Create buy-in.
The awareness that sanctions are being enforced will …  
increase perceptions about the likelihood of punishment, and will 
thus be the most salient deterrent …
